14. Selling secondhand products through an online platform with blockchain
借助区块链通过在线平台销售二手商品 · Analytical journal article (game-theory pricing model with numerical examples; no empirical data). Read from the Europe PMC full text, so locations are section headings, not pages. 分析型期刊论文(博弈论定价模型 + 数值算例;没有实证数据)。本文据 Europe PMC 全文阅读,位置以章节标题代替页码。 · Ch 6.3, 9, 10, 11 · 30 min
Shen, B., Xu, X., & Yuan, Q. (2020). Selling secondhand products through an online platform with blockchain. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 142, Article 102066. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tre.2020.102066
The paper in 60 seconds · 60 秒读懂
Owners consign used goods to one online platform, which competes with a brand selling new goods.物主把二手商品寄售给一个在线平台,平台与销售新品的品牌方竞争。
Without blockchain, buyers and the brand only guess the used item's quality; with it, everyone sees the true quality.没有区块链时,买家和品牌只能猜二手商品的质量;有了区块链,所有人都能看到真实质量。
Whether blockchain pays depends on product uniqueness and true quality: it suits unique, high-quality goods such as luxury items.区块链是否划算,取决于产品独特性和真实质量:它适合独特且高质量的商品,例如奢侈品。
With blockchain, a brand that runs its own resale platform (horizontal integration) always earns more total profit.使用区块链时,品牌自营二手平台(横向整合)总能获得更高的总利润。
The model assumes a used item never costs more than a new one, so it leaves out limited editions.模型假设二手价不高于新品价,因此排除了限量版商品。
Why we read it · 为什么要读
It names the core problem of online resale: buyers cannot judge quality or authenticity from photos.它点出了线上二手交易的核心问题:买家无法凭照片判断质量或真伪。
It gives a formal case for a brand-run, verified resale channel, which we can test against Xianyu 闲鱼 and Qiandao 千岛.它为品牌自营、可验证的二手渠道提供了理论依据,可与闲鱼、千岛对照讨论。
It warns that proving quality can push prices up, which matters for our price chapter.它提醒我们,证明质量可能推高价格,这与我们的价格章节相关。
20-minute reading path · 20 分钟阅读路线
Pages 页码
What to read
读什么
Abstract; Background and motivation
Read the highlights and the motivation for the quality and fakes problem.
先读要点和背景,了解质量与假货问题。
The model
Read the set-up and the price cap that excludes limited editions.
阅读模型设定,以及排除限量版的价格上限假设。
Equilibrium analysis
Read when blockchain pays, including the luxury recommendation.
阅读区块链何时划算,包括对奢侈品的建议。
Centralized SC (The platform and the supplier are integrated)
Skim the brand-run platform results and Table 3.
浏览品牌自营平台的结果和表 3。
Welfare analysis; Conclusion, managerial insights, and future research directions
Finish with the welfare warning for unique goods and the limits.
最后阅读关于独特商品的福利警示和论文局限。
Abstract (highlights) · 摘要(要点)
Pages · 页码 Abstract
The paper studies the quality-disclosure effect of blockchain for secondhand goods (Abstract).论文研究区块链对二手商品的质量披露效应(摘要)。
Contributors consign used goods to an online platform, which resells them (Abstract).出售者(contributor)把二手商品寄售(consign)给在线平台,由平台转卖(摘要)。
Pricing strategy changes with the revenue share in the consignment contract (Abstract).定价策略随寄售合同中的收入分成比例而变化(摘要)。
With blockchain, horizontal integration raises total supply-chain profit more (Abstract).使用区块链时,横向整合(horizontal integration)更能提升供应链总利润(摘要)。
A "win-win-win" outcome is possible when low-uniqueness goods are sold (Abstract).销售低独特性商品时,可以实现「三赢」结果(摘要)。
Introduction: Background and motivation · 引言:背景与动机
Pages · 页码 Background and motivation
A GMI survey found about 70% of consumers have bought secondhand goods (Background and motivation).GMI 调查显示,约 70% 的消费者买过二手商品(背景与动机)。
Buyers cannot know a used item's true quality before buying, since sellers know more (Background and motivation).卖家掌握的信息更多,买家在购买前无法知道二手商品的真实质量(背景与动机)。
This creates a moral hazard problem; fakes are common in luxury resale (Background and motivation).这造成了道德风险(moral hazard)问题;奢侈品二手市场假货很多(背景与动机)。
Gartner expects at least 30% of large manufacturers to use blockchain by 2023 (Background and motivation).Gartner 预计到 2023 年,至少 30% 的大型制造企业将采用区块链(背景与动机)。
RFID can also disclose quality, but buyers trust it less because people can edit its records (Background and motivation).RFID 也能披露质量,但因为记录可被人修改,买家不太信任(背景与动机)。
Blockchain gives a trusted "certificate" of history: how long, by whom and how an item was used (Background and motivation).区块链提供可信的历史「证书」:用了多久、谁用过、怎么用的(背景与动机)。
The RealReal takes consigned luxury goods and shares revenue with the owner when an item sells (Background and motivation).The RealReal 接受奢侈品寄售,售出后与物主分成(背景与动机)。
Patagonia's Worn Wear gives owners credit up to 50% of an item's resale value (Background and motivation).Patagonia 的 Worn Wear 给物主最高相当于转售价 50% 的额度(背景与动机)。
The model rests on five features: disclosure, network effects, consignment, platform pricing, and independent or integrated platforms (Background and motivation).模型基于 5 个现实特征:质量披露、网络效应、寄售、平台定价、平台独立或与品牌整合(背景与动机)。
Online, buyers cannot tell quality from "the description and photos" (Background and motivation).在线上,买家无法凭「描述和照片」判断质量(背景与动机)。
Introduction: Research questions, contributions and structure · 引言:研究问题、贡献与结构
Pages · 页码 Research questions and contributions + Paper organization and structure
Players: many contributors, one online platform selling used goods, and one supplier selling new goods (Research questions and contributions).参与者:众多出售者、一个销售二手商品的在线平台、一个销售新品的供应商(研究问题与贡献)。
Two structures: an independent platform that competes (decentralized), or one merged with the supplier (centralized) (Research questions and contributions).两种结构:独立且与品牌竞争的平台(分散式),或与供应商合并的平台(集中式)(研究问题与贡献)。
RQ 1 asks about pricing and quality strategy; RQ 2 about blockchain; RQ 3 about integration (Research questions and contributions).RQ 1 研究定价与质量策略;RQ 2 研究区块链的影响;RQ 3 研究整合的影响(研究问题与贡献)。
Low-uniqueness goods get a lower used price; high-uniqueness goods get the same price as new (Research questions and contributions).低独特性商品的二手价更低;高独特性商品的二手价与新品相同(研究问题与贡献)。
For low-uniqueness goods, blockchain suits low-quality items, not high-quality ones (Research questions and contributions).对低独特性商品,区块链适合低质量品,不适合高质量品(研究问题与贡献)。
For high-uniqueness goods, blockchain pays for high-quality items but can hurt total welfare (Research questions and contributions).对高独特性商品,区块链对高质量品有利,但可能损害总福利(研究问题与贡献)。
The authors say this is the first paper on blockchain for platform resale of used goods (Research questions and contributions).作者称这是第一篇研究区块链用于平台二手销售的论文(研究问题与贡献)。
Secondhand studies show used goods compete with new ones but rarely model quality information gaps (Secondhand products operations).二手商品研究表明二手与新品竞争,但很少建模质量信息差距(二手商品运营)。
Platform studies cover fees, revenue sharing and reseller versus marketplace choices (Online platform operations).平台研究涉及平台费、收入分成,以及自营与开放平台的选择(在线平台运营)。
Blockchain studies stress transparency of origin, use and users across the supply chain (Blockchain technology in supply chains).区块链研究强调供应链中来源、使用情况和使用者的透明度(供应链中的区块链技术)。
A prior study found blockchain helps social welfare but not supply-chain profit in sustainable fashion (Blockchain technology in supply chains).已有研究发现,在可持续时尚中区块链有利于社会福利,但不利于供应链利润(供应链中的区块链技术)。
In consignment, the owner keeps the item, but here the platform still sets the price (Consignment contracts).寄售中物主保留商品所有权,但本文中仍由平台定价(寄售合同)。
The set-up resembles vendor-managed inventory, where the owner holds stock and the seller prices it (Consignment contracts).这一设定类似供应商管理库存(VMI):物主持有库存,卖方定价(寄售合同)。
The model · 模型设定
Pages · 页码 The model
The supplier sells high-quality new goods; the platform sells lower-quality used goods (The model).供应商销售高质量新品;平台销售质量较低的二手商品(模型设定)。
The platform inspects items, keeps those above a standard and returns the rest, like Amazon Warehouse (The model).平台验货后保留达标品、退回不达标品,类似 Amazon Warehouse(模型设定)。
New-product quality is set to 1, and the used price can never exceed the new price (The model).新品质量设为 1,二手价不能高于新品价(模型设定)。
The authors note this price cap fails "for limited edition products" (The model).作者指出,这一价格上限对「限量版商品」不成立(模型设定)。
The contributor gets a fixed share of the sale price; the platform keeps the rest (The model).出售者按固定比例分得售价,其余归平台(模型设定)。
A contributor consigns only if that share beats the item's salvage value to them (The model).只有分成收入高于商品对其的残值(salvage value)时,物主才会寄售(模型设定)。
Four cases: decentralized or centralized, each with or without blockchain (The model).共 4 种情形:分散式或集中式,各自有无区块链(模型设定)。
Without blockchain, buyers see only perceived quality; the platform and contributors know true quality (The model).没有区块链时,买家只看到感知质量;平台和出售者知道真实质量(模型设定)。
Order of play: contributors send items, the supplier prices new goods, then the platform prices used goods (The model).博弈顺序:出售者寄出商品,供应商先给新品定价,平台再给二手品定价(模型设定)。
Decentralized SC: without blockchain · 分散式供应链:无区块链
Pages · 页码 Decentralized SC + Without the use of blockchain
Buyers gain more from the used market when more contributors join, a network effect (Decentralized SC).出售者越多,买家从二手市场获得的效用越高,这是网络效应(分散式供应链)。
Each buyer picks the option with higher utility; if used stock runs out, they buy new (Decentralized SC).买家选择效用更高的选项;若二手品缺货,就转买新品(分散式供应链)。
Uniqueness is the buyer-to-contributor ratio, M/N: high for luxury fashion, low for textbooks (Decentralized SC).独特性用买家与出售者的规模比 M/N 表示:奢侈时尚高,教科书低(分散式供应链)。
Case A (low uniqueness): the platform prices used goods below new ones (Decentralized SC).Case A(低独特性):平台给二手品的定价低于新品(分散式供应链)。
Case B (high uniqueness): used goods are in short supply and sell at the new price (Decentralized SC).Case B(高独特性):二手品供不应求,按新品价格出售(分散式供应链)。
A high contributor share pushes toward differential pricing; a low share toward uniform pricing (Decentralized SC).出售者分成高时倾向差别定价;分成低时倾向统一定价(分散式供应链)。
In Case A, the platform prefers moderate quality, not very high or very low, which the authors call counterintuitive (Decentralized SC).在 Case A 中,平台偏好中等质量,而非极高或极低,作者认为这有违直觉(分散式供应链)。
In Case B, true quality does not matter; both firms gain when perceived quality rises (Decentralized SC).在 Case B 中,真实质量无关紧要;感知质量越高,双方利润越高(分散式供应链)。
Decentralized SC: with blockchain · 分散式供应链:有区块链
Pages · 页码 With the use of blockchain
With blockchain, perceived quality equals true quality for everyone, so moral hazard is removed (With the use of blockchain).有区块链时,所有人的感知质量等于真实质量,道德风险被消除(有区块链)。
The supplier pays a fixed operating cost F for the blockchain (With the use of blockchain).供应商为运营区块链支付固定成本 F(有区块链)。
The pricing pattern is unchanged: differential in Case A, uniform in Case B (With the use of blockchain).定价模式不变:Case A 差别定价,Case B 统一定价(有区块链)。
In Case A, both firms earn more when true quality is lower, because competition with new goods eases (With the use of blockchain).在 Case A 中,真实质量越低,双方利润越高,因为与新品的竞争变弱(有区块链)。
In Case B, both firms earn more when true quality is higher, since they raise prices to match (With the use of blockchain).在 Case B 中,真实质量越高,双方利润越高,因为它们会相应提价(有区块链)。
In Case A, blockchain raises prices when true quality is below perceived quality (Equilibrium analysis).在 Case A 中,若真实质量低于感知质量,区块链会使价格上升(均衡分析)。
In Case B, blockchain raises prices when true quality is above perceived quality (Equilibrium analysis).在 Case B 中,若真实质量高于感知质量,区块链会使价格上升(均衡分析)。
If the operating cost is large, the supplier should not adopt blockchain (Equilibrium analysis).如果运营成本很高,供应商不应采用区块链(均衡分析)。
In Case A with negligible cost, blockchain helps the supplier but can hurt the platform at moderate true quality (Equilibrium analysis).在 Case A 且成本可忽略时,区块链有利于供应商,但在真实质量中等时可能损害平台(均衡分析)。
In Case B, blockchain hurts both firms when true quality is below what buyers believe (Equilibrium analysis).在 Case B 中,若真实质量低于买家的认知,区块链会损害双方(均衡分析)。
For high-quality, high-uniqueness goods such as luxury, blockchain is recommended for both firms (Equilibrium analysis).对高质量、高独特性商品(如奢侈品),建议双方都采用区块链(均衡分析)。
Centralized SC: without blockchain · 集中式供应链:无区块链
Pages · 页码 Centralized SC (The platform and the supplier are integrated) + Without the use of blockchain
Here the brand runs the resale platform itself, like Patagonia's Worn Wear (Centralized SC).此时品牌自己经营二手平台,例如 Patagonia 的 Worn Wear(集中式供应链)。
The merged firm knows true quality, but buyers still see only perceived quality (Centralized SC).合并后的企业知道真实质量,但买家仍只能看到感知质量(集中式供应链)。
The pricing pattern by uniqueness is the same as in the decentralized case, which shows robustness (Centralized SC).按独特性划分的定价模式与分散式相同,说明结论稳健(集中式供应链)。
In Case A, integration raises both new and used prices, because competition is softer (Centralized SC).在 Case A 中,整合会同时提高新品和二手价,因为竞争减弱(集中式供应链)。
In Case B, prices can fall after integration if perceived quality is relatively high (Centralized SC).在 Case B 中,若感知质量较高,整合后价格可能下降(集中式供应链)。
Fig. 3 shows integration can lower total profit when true quality is low, so it is "not always advisable" (Centralized SC).图 3 显示,真实质量低时整合可能降低总利润,因此「并非总是可取」(集中式供应链)。
Centralized SC: with blockchain · 集中式供应链:有区块链
Pages · 页码 With the use of blockchain
Blockchain does not change the merged firm's prices, because it already knows true quality (With the use of blockchain).区块链不会改变合并企业的定价,因为它本来就知道真实质量(有区块链)。
Profits still change, because buyers now decide on true quality (With the use of blockchain).但利润会变,因为买家现在按真实质量做决定(有区块链)。
With blockchain, integration always raises total profit through higher prices (With the use of blockchain).有区块链时,整合总能通过提价提高总利润(有区块链)。
With negligible cost, moderate quality can make blockchain hurt the merged firm's profit (With the use of blockchain).成本可忽略时,若质量中等,区块链可能损害合并企业的利润(有区块链)。
So blockchain is advised in a merged chain only when true quality is very high or very low (With the use of blockchain).因此,只有真实质量很高或很低时,才建议集中式供应链采用区块链(有区块链)。
Table 3: blockchain helps for low-uniqueness low-quality or high-uniqueness high-quality goods (With the use of blockchain).表 3:区块链对低独特性低质量品、或高独特性高质量品有正面作用(有区块链)。
Fig. 4: blockchain is never optimal in a decentralized chain, since integration then always does better (With the use of blockchain).图 4:在分散式供应链中采用区块链从来不是最优,因为此时整合总是更好(有区块链)。
Fig. 4: with low true quality and high uniqueness, both firms prefer staying separate (With the use of blockchain).图 4:真实质量低且独特性高时,双方都偏好保持分立(有区块链)。
Welfare analysis · 福利分析
Pages · 页码 Welfare analysis
Total welfare adds contributors, used-goods buyers and new-goods buyers (Welfare analysis).总福利包括出售者、二手品买家和新品买家三部分(福利分析)。
Blockchain helps contributors only in the decentralized chain, not the merged one (Welfare analysis).区块链只在分散式供应链中提升出售者福利,在集中式中没有作用(福利分析)。
Revealing lower true quality can oddly help low-uniqueness contributors, because prices rise (Welfare analysis).披露较低的真实质量反而可能有利于低独特性商品的出售者,因为价格会上升(福利分析)。
For low-uniqueness goods, blockchain helps consumers when true quality beats perceived quality (Welfare analysis).对低独特性商品,若真实质量高于感知质量,区块链有利于消费者(福利分析)。
For high-uniqueness goods, disclosing high quality hurts total welfare, because firms raise prices in short supply (Welfare analysis).对高独特性商品,披露高质量会损害总福利,因为供不应求时企业会提价(福利分析)。
Integration lifts total welfare for low-uniqueness goods but lowers it for high-uniqueness goods (Welfare analysis).整合会提高低独特性商品的总福利,但降低高独特性商品的总福利(福利分析)。
For unique goods, the degree of "scarcity" matters more to buyers than price (Welfare analysis).对独特商品而言,「稀缺」程度比价格更受买家重视(福利分析)。
Conclusion, managerial insights and future research · 结论、管理启示与未来研究
Pages · 页码 Conclusion, managerial insights, and future research directions
With blockchain, the platform prefers low-uniqueness, low-quality used goods (Conclusion).有区块链时,平台偏好低独特性、低质量的二手商品(结论)。
For high-uniqueness goods, blockchain is advised for high quality, not for low quality (Conclusion).对高独特性商品,建议高质量品采用区块链,低质量品不建议(结论)。
A merged chain selling low-uniqueness goods can make platform, supplier and consumers all better off (Conclusion).销售低独特性商品的集中式供应链,可让平台、供应商和消费者都受益(结论)。
Limit 1: used prices above new, as for limited editions, are left for future work (Conclusion).局限 1:二手价高于新品价(如限量版)的情形留待未来研究(结论)。
Limit 2: the revenue share is fixed from outside, not chosen by the platform (Conclusion).局限 2:收入分成比例由外部给定,不由平台选择(结论)。
Limit 3: past prices of used items, a key reference for buyers, are ignored (Conclusion).局限 3:忽略了二手商品的历史价格,而这是买家的重要参考(结论)。
Limits 4 and 5: no set-up cost of blockchain and no demand updating from sales data (Conclusion).局限 4 和 5:没有考虑区块链的实施成本,也没有用销售数据更新需求(结论)。
Figures and tables · 图表解读
Exhibit 图表
How to read it
怎么看
Table 1 (Background and motivation)
Lists firms using blockchain for luxury goods, diamonds and vehicles. Our text copy names only these categories, not the table rows.
列出在奢侈品、钻石、汽车领域使用区块链的企业。我们的文本版本只写明这些品类,没有表格具体内容。
Fig. 1 (The model)
The four set-ups: decentralized or centralized, with or without blockchain. A caret marks who sees only perceived quality.
4 种设定:分散式或集中式,各自有无区块链。带尖号(^)的表示只能看到感知质量的一方。
Table 2 (The model)
Notation list. Key symbols: q true quality, q^ perceived quality, τ contributor share, M and N market sizes, F blockchain cost.
符号表。关键符号:q 真实质量,q^ 感知质量,τ 出售者分成,M 和 N 市场规模,F 区块链成本。
Fig. 2 (The model)
Game sequence: inspection, supplier sets new price, platform sets used price, then sales.
博弈顺序:验货、供应商定新品价、平台定二手价、然后销售。
Fig. 3 (Centralized SC)
Total profit, merged minus separate, by revenue share and true quality. Panel (a) is low uniqueness; (b) is high uniqueness.
按分成比例和真实质量,比较集中式与分散式的总利润差。(a) 为低独特性,(b) 为高独特性。
Table 3 (Centralized SC, with blockchain)
A plus/minus grid of blockchain's effect on profit by uniqueness and quality. Use it as the one-page summary.
按独特性和质量列出区块链对利润影响的正负表,可作为一页总结。
Fig. 4 (Centralized SC, with blockchain)
Best set-up (DNB, DB, CNB, CB) for each firm across quality and uniqueness. DB never wins.
按质量和独特性,显示各方的最优设定(DNB、DB、CNB、CB)。DB 从不是最优。
Fig. 5 (Welfare analysis)
Change in total welfare from blockchain as contributor numbers grow. Above zero means blockchain helps welfare.
随出售者数量增加,区块链带来的总福利变化。高于零表示区块链提升福利。
Fig. 6 (Welfare analysis)
Change in total welfare from integration. Positive for low uniqueness, negative for high uniqueness.
整合带来的总福利变化。低独特性为正,高独特性为负。
Table 4 (Conclusion)
The authors' list of insights and managerial recommendations.
作者整理的主要发现与管理建议列表。
Key terms · 关键术语
Term 术语
Meaning
解释
consignment 寄售
The owner keeps the item, the platform sells it, and they split the revenue if it sells.
物主保留商品所有权,由平台代卖,售出后双方分成。
contributor 出售者(寄卖物主)
A person who sends a used item to the platform to sell.
把二手商品寄给平台出售的人。
information asymmetry 信息不对称
One side knows more than the other; here sellers know true quality and buyers do not.
一方比另一方知道得多;这里是卖家知道真实质量,买家不知道。
moral hazard 道德风险
The risk that the better-informed side takes advantage, such as passing off a poor or fake item.
信息较多的一方可能占便宜的风险,例如以次充好或卖假货。
perceived quality vs true quality 感知质量与真实质量
What buyers believe about a used item, versus its actual condition.
买家以为的二手商品质量,与其实际状况的区别。
permissioned blockchain 许可链
A shared record that only approved users can read and that no one can edit alone.
只有获准用户可读、任何个人都无法单独修改的共享记录。
product uniqueness (M/N) 产品独特性
The ratio of buyers to contributors. High means many buyers chase few used items.
买家与出售者的规模比。比值高表示很多买家争抢少量二手品。
uniform vs differential pricing 统一定价与差别定价
Uniform: used and new sell at the same price. Differential: used sells cheaper.
统一定价:二手与新品同价;差别定价:二手更便宜。
decentralized vs centralized supply chain 分散式与集中式供应链
Decentralized: the platform is independent. Centralized: the brand owns the platform.
分散式:平台独立经营;集中式:品牌拥有平台。
horizontal integration 横向整合
Here, a brand selling new goods also runs the platform for its used goods.
这里指销售新品的品牌同时经营自家二手平台。
network effect 网络效应
More contributors make the used market more attractive to buyers.
出售者越多,二手市场对买家越有吸引力。
salvage value 残值
What the used item is worth to its owner if not sold on the platform.
二手商品若不在平台出售,对物主而言的价值。
Numbers we can cite · 可引用的数字
Value 数值
What it measures
含义
Page 页
about 70%
Share of consumers who have bought secondhand goods (GMI survey).
买过二手商品的消费者占比(GMI 调查)。
p. Background and motivation
at least 30% by 2023
Gartner forecast of large manufacturers adopting blockchain.
Gartner 预测采用区块链的大型制造商比例。
p. Background and motivation
USD5 billion
Product value of the manufacturers in the Gartner forecast.
Gartner 预测中所指制造商的产品价值。
p. Background and motivation
up to 50%
Worn Wear credit to owners, as a share of resale value.
Worn Wear 给物主的额度占转售价的比例上限。
p. Background and motivation
15%
Revenue share The RealReal pays contributors, per the authors' footnote.
作者脚注所述 The RealReal 付给出售者的收入比例。
p. Footnotes
50%
Patagonia's revenue share with contributors, per the same footnote.
同一脚注所述 Patagonia 与出售者的分成比例。
p. Footnotes
3 research questions (RQ 1–RQ 3)
Number of research questions.
研究问题的数量。
p. Research questions and contributions
quality of new product = 1
New-product quality is the benchmark for used quality.
新品质量作为衡量二手质量的基准。
p. The model
τ ∈ (0,1)
Range of the contributor's share of the sale price.
出售者分得售价比例的取值范围。
p. The model
N=1, v=0.8, α=0.9, q^=0.5
Parameter values used for Fig. 3.
图 3 使用的参数值。
p. Centralized SC (The platform and the supplier are integrated)
M=0.1 vs M=1
Low versus high uniqueness in panels (a) and (b) of Fig. 3.
图 3 中 (a)、(b) 两图分别代表低独特性与高独特性。
p. Centralized SC (The platform and the supplier are integrated)
v=0.6, τ=0.8, α=1, N=0.8, q^=0.6
Parameter values used for Figs. 5 and 6.
图 5 和图 6 使用的参数值。
p. Welfare analysis
M=0.1 vs M=1
Low versus high uniqueness in panels (a) and (b) of Figs. 5 and 6.
图 5 和图 6 中 (a)、(b) 两图分别代表低独特性与高独特性。
p. Welfare analysis
What it means for our report · 对报告的意义
Ch 9: The paper explains why fakes thrive on Xianyu 闲鱼: buyers cannot judge quality from photos (Background and motivation).第 9 章:论文解释了假货为何在闲鱼泛滥:买家无法凭照片判断质量(背景与动机)。
Ch 6.3: Hidden figures 隐藏款 and Labubu look like high-uniqueness goods, where blockchain helps both brand and platform (Equilibrium analysis). This mapping is ours.第 6.3 章:隐藏款和 Labubu 类似高独特性商品,在这种情形下区块链对品牌和平台都有利(均衡分析)。这一对应是我们的判断。
Ch 10: Proven quality can push resale prices up, so verification may raise, not cool, Labubu resale prices (Welfare analysis).第 10 章:证明质量可能推高二手价,因此验真可能抬高而非压低 Labubu 二手价(福利分析)。
Ch 11: With blockchain, a brand-run resale channel always earns more total profit than a separate platform (With the use of blockchain). This argues for an official Pop Mart 泡泡玛特 channel over leaving resale to Qiandao 千岛.第 11 章:有区块链时,品牌自营二手渠道的总利润总高于独立平台(有区块链)。这支持泡泡玛特建立官方渠道,而非把二手交易交给千岛。
Ch 10: The model excludes resale above retail (The model), so treat these results as direction, not forecast, for Pop Mart.第 10 章:模型排除了二手价高于零售价的情形(模型设定),因此对泡泡玛特只能当作方向,不能当作预测。
Limits and where it does not fit · 局限与不适用之处
It is a pure theory model with no sales data, so it shows directions, not sizes.这是纯理论模型,没有销售数据,只能说明方向,不能说明大小。
It caps used prices at the new price, which rules out Pop Mart's main resale case: hidden figures above retail.它把二手价上限设为新品价,排除了泡泡玛特最主要的二手情形:隐藏款溢价高于零售价。
Quality here means wear and condition; for sealed blind boxes 盲盒, authenticity matters more than wear.这里的质量指磨损和成色;对未拆封的盲盒而言,真伪比成色更重要。
Only the operating cost F is modelled; the set-up cost of blockchain is left out, so adoption looks cheaper than it is.模型只包含运营成本 F,未计入区块链的建设成本,使采用看起来比实际更便宜。
Our text copy has some figure cross-reference slips (for example "Fig. 2(a)" for Fig. 3), so check figures in the original PDF.我们的文本版本有一些图号引用错误(例如把图 3 写成「Fig. 2(a)」),引用图表前应核对原版 PDF。
Questions for the group · 小组讨论问题
Would a verified official resale channel cool Labubu prices, or push them higher as the paper predicts?官方验真二手渠道会让 Labubu 价格降温,还是像论文预测的那样把价格推得更高?
Is a hidden figure "high-uniqueness" in the paper's sense, given that its resale price often beats retail?隐藏款的二手价常高于零售价,它还算论文所说的「高独特性」商品吗?
Does Pop Mart need blockchain, or would a simpler anti-fake code do the same job for buyers?泡泡玛特需要区块链吗?还是更简单的防伪码就能为买家起到同样作用?
Written by the group from the full text. Numbers and page references were checked against the source. Licensed cases and reports are summarised, not reproduced.
由小组根据全文整理,数字与页码已对照原文核对。授权案例与报告只作摘要,不转载原文。